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RECENT DECISIONS
which occurred in the present case, discharges the guarantor's liability
for damages. It may be argued that these factors worked to heal
the breach of the guaranty obligation. Therefore, the new contract
following the cancellation of the original contract, if it be treated as
a modification,22 would not deprive the agent-guarantors of their com-
missions on performance of the new contracts. Yet such a rule may
lead to injustice where the principal, in face of a wilful refusal by the
agent-guarantors to pay, prejudicially changes his position.
Although in this case it appears that punctual payment on the
conditional sales contract may have been a material consideration for
the commissions, nevertheless the Court's decision may be justified
because there was nothing expressed in the agency-guaranty contract
that punctuality was essential and because there was no proof that the
agents refused or otherwise wilfully failed to pay on the guaranty
before the new contracts were made.
ARBITRATION-INCORPORATION OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE BY
REFERENCE DENiED.-Plaintiff moved for an order to stay arbitration
proceedings, contending that he had not intended to restrict his rem-
edies to arbitration by the signing of a contract which failed to men-
tion arbitration, but was, by its terms, "subject to the Cotton Yarn
Rules of 1938." These Rules provided for arbitration as an exclusive
remedy. In reversing the Appellate Division,' the Court granted
plaintiff's motion, holding that the words in the contract did not evince
a clear intent to make arbitration the exclusive remedy. Matter of
Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 306 N.Y. 288, 118 N.E.2d 104 (1954).
Prior to the enactment of the New York Arbitration Law in
1920,2 the New York courts applied the common-law rule which de-
nied the remedy of specific enforcement to arbitration contracts. 3 It
was the judicial view at that time that disputes regarding contracts
should be settled under the auspices of the law courts, and not by
arbitration.4 However, subsequent to 1920, and due, in large measure,
see Siedentopf v. Braune, 273 App. Div. 791, 75 N.Y.S2d 326 (2d Dep't 1947).
22 See notes 12, 13 and 14 supra.
1281 App. Div. 983, 121 N.Y.S.2d 261 (2d Dep't 1953) (On the basis of
the Court of Appeals decision in Matter of Level Export Corp., 305 N.Y. 82,
111 N.E.2d 218 (1953), the Appellate Division affirmed the order of the trial
court that dismissed the petition and directed that the controversy proceed to
arbitration.).2 Laws of N.Y. 1920, c. 275. This statute is presently N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
Act, Art. 84, §§ 1448-1469.3 Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N.Y. 491 (1858) ; see Matter of Feuer Transp.,
Inc., 295 N.Y. 87, 91, 65 N.E.2d 178, 180 (1946).
4 See Simpson, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 160, 162 (1934) ; Note, 24 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 254, 255 n.5 (1950).
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to congested court calendars and extensive litigation involving com-
mercial disputes, an increasingly favorable view has been maintained
by the courts and the Legislature towards the more expeditious relief
realized through arbitration. 5
The Arbitration Law requires that a contract to submit an exist-
ing controversy to arbitration must be in writing and subscribed by
the party to be charged, but that a contract to submit a future con-
troversy need only be in writing.6 By judicial decision, it is not re-
quired that the contract specifically mention arbitration, as no par-
ticular terminology is necessary. 7 However, due to the nature of the
arbitration contract, the courts are still reluctant to require a party to
arbitrate," unless it can be shown, by clear and convincing language,
that such party intended to restrict his remedy to arbitration. 9 The
proposed Uniform Commercial Code, though not specifically mention-
ing arbitration, presents an interesting point of view on this matter.
Under the Code, parol evidence is admissible to show custom and
usage of the trade, and also, any prior dealings between the parties,
even though the contract be clear and unambiguous on its face.10
Since the courts presently restrict the use of parol evidence even where
ambiguity exists-apparently resolving any ambiguity against the pos-
sibility that the parties agreed to arbitrate "--the proposed Code, if
adopted, would probably not be applied to questions of arbitration
submission.
Where the written contract includes a clear and unambiguous
arbitration clause, there is, of course, no question that the parties ac-
tually intend that they be thereafter bound to arbitrate.' 2  This fol-
lows from the reasoning that parties to a written contract, in the
absence of fraud, are conclusively presumed to know and to have
assented to the contents of the agreement.'3 However, in the absence
5 See Matter of Knickerbocker Textile Corp. v. Shiela-Lynn, Inc., 172
Misc. 1015, 1018, 16 N.Y.S.2d 435, 438 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd inen., 259 App.
Div. 992, 20 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1st Dep't 1940); see Shandalow, Contract Terms
Held Binding by Court, 8 ARB. J. 126 (1953).
6 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1449, Matter of Tanenbaum Textile Co. v.
Schlanger, 287 N.Y. 400, 40 N.E.2d 225 (1942).
7 See Matter of Hub Industries, Inc., 183 Misc. 767, 54 N.Y.S.2d 106
(Sup. Ct. 1944).
8 See Matter of Phillip Export Corp., 275 App. Div. 102, 104, 87 N.Y.S.2d
665, 667 (1st Dep't 1949).
9 See Matter of Lehman v. Ostrovsky, 264 N.Y. 130, 132, 190 N.E. 208,
209 (1934) (wherein Chief Judge Pound stated that "[n]o one is under a
duty to resort to arbitration unless by clear language he has so agreed.").
10 UNIFORM Comms-RcIAL CODE § 2-202 (1952).
1See Matter of General Silk Importing Co., 200 App. Div. 786, 792,
194 N.Y. Supp. 15, 20 (1st Dep't), aff'd imn., 234 N.Y. 513, 138 N.E. 427
(1922).
12 Matter of Newburger v. Lubell, 257 N.Y. 213, 177 N.E. 424 (1931);
Matter of General Footwear Corp. v. A. C. Laurence Leather Co., 252 N.Y.
577, 170 N.E. 149 (1929).
13 Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N.Y. 159, 170 N.E. 530 (1930).
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of any arbitration clause in the contract, under what circumstances
may a party be nonetheless bound to arbitrate? It would seem, ac-
cording to the opinion expressed by the Court in the instant case, that
a contract to arbitrate must either include an arbitration clause or
provide an "incorporation clause." 14 An "incorporation clause" 15
makes an extrinsic document requiring arbitration part of the contract
by a definite reference thereto and results in the conclusion that the
parties assented to arbitration. 16 This reasoning results from the ap-
plication of the doctrine of incorporation by reference, whereby the
extrinsic document referred to, is made, in legal effect, an actual part
of the written contract.17
However, the intent of the parties to incorporate must be shown
by clear and unambiguous language.' 8 Where, as in Matter of Level
Export Corp., the contract was ". . . subject to the provisions of
STANDARD Cor o TEXTILE SALESNOTE which, by this reference, is
incorporated as part of this agreement . . . " the court stated that
there was no question that the parties intended the extrinsic document
to be, in legal effect, an actual part of the signed contract.' 9 The
Court, in the instant case, distinguishes the ruling in the Level case,
in that the phrase used in the present contract, "subject to the Cotton
Yarn Rules of 1938," without any further reference, did not constitute
sufficiently clear and unambiguous language to show an intent by the
parties to legally effectuate an incorporation.2 0 The words, "subject
to," being words of condition, 21 are construed as restricting the terms
of the contract, rather than adding to them. They are words of qual-
ification, rather than words of contract.2 2  Consequently, their use in
a contract is not sufficient to show an intent to incorporate within the
contract an extrinsic document requiring arbitration.
14 See Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 306 N.Y. 288, 290-292, 118 N.E.2d
104, 105-106 (1954); Matter of General Silk Importing Co., 198 App. Div.
16, 21, 189 N.Y. Supp. 391, 395 (1st Dep't 1921).
15 See Matter of Level Export Corp., 305 N.Y. 82, 111 N.E.2d 218 (1953)(wherein an "incorporation clause" was included in the contract).
26 Id. at 86, 111 N.E.2d at 220.
'7 See Matter of Hines, 222 App. Div. 543, 226 N.Y. Supp. 562 (1st Dep't
1928) ; see Matter of Comm'rs of Washington Park, 52 N.Y. 131, 134 (1873).
18 See Matter of Conm'rs of Washington Park, supra note 17 at 134; see
Western Vegetable Oils Co. v. So. Cotton Oil Co., 141 F.2d 235 (9th Cir.
1944).
'1 See Matter of Level Export Corp., 305 N.Y. 82, 86, 111 N.E.2d 218, 220(1953).
20 See Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 306 N.Y. 288, 291, 118 N.E.2d
104, 106 (1954).
21 See Berk & Co. v. Derecktor, 301 N.Y. 110, 112-113, 92 N.E.2d 914, 915
(1950); Auburn & Syracuse Electric R.tR v. Headley, 119 Misc. 94, 98, 195
N.Y. Supp. 517, 521 (Sup. Ct. 1922), aff'd, 206 App. Div. 653, 198 N.Y. Supp.
899 (4th Dep't 1923).2 See S. T. McKnight Co. v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 120 F.2d
310, 320 (8th Cir. 1941).
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The courts should not direct the parties to arbitrate unless the
terms of the contract clearly indicate that the parties intended to waive
their inherent right to resort to the law courts. In an attempt to
defeat the prospect of deception being practiced by various business
groups on unsuspecting parties, the Court of Appeals has reaffirmed
the restrictions set forth in the Level case with respect to an attempted
incorporation of an arbitration requirement.
A
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - EFFECT OF CHANGE OF CUSTODY ON
SUPPORT PROVISIONS OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS.-Under the terms
of a separation agreement, plaintiff-wife was to have custody of the
children and the defendant was to pay plaintiff the lump sum of $2,500
per month for herself and for the "support, education and mainte-
nance" of the children. When the defendant was awarded custody of
the children in a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding,' he reduced
the monthly payments to the plaintiff by one half. Plaintiff brought
this action to recover the full amount due under the agreement.
Held: The change in custody does not warrant a reduction in the
payments since the separation agreement does not provide for any
such reduction and the plaintiff in no way breached the agreement.
Nichols v. Nichols, 306 N.Y. 490, 119 N.E.2d 351 (1954).
Separation agreements are to be construed according to the basic
rules of contract construction. If the terms of the agreement are un-
ambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found therein. 2 The
courts will not imply or insert conditions which the parties themselves
chose not to insert." Moreover, the courts will not modify one pro-
vision and leave the rest of the agreement intact. 4 Accordingly, if
one of the parties breaches the agreement, the aggrieved party's rem-
edy is not reformation. 5 However, adhering t6 the applicable prin-
1 The children, having refused to make their home with the mother, went
to live with the father. When he refused to return them, the mother instituted
the habeas corpus proceeding to regain their custody.
2 See Brainard v. New York Central R.R., 242 N.Y. 125, 151 N.E. 152
(1926); Hartigan v. Casualty Co. of America, 227 N.Y. 175, 124 N.E. 789
(1919); Matter of Brown, 153 Misc. 282, 274 N.Y. Supp. 924 (Surr. Ct.
1934).
3 Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N.Y. 13, 124 N.E. 91 (1919); see Raner v.
Goldberg, 244 N.Y. 438, 155 N.E. 733 (1927).
4 Stoddard v. Stoddard, supra note 3; Johnson v. Johnson, 206 N.Y. 561,
100 N.E. 408 (1912).
5 "Such agreements, lawful when made, will be enforced like other agree-
ments unless impeached or challenged for some cause recognized by law. It
is not in the power of either party acting alone and against the will of the
other to destroy or change the agreement." Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y.
296, 300, 26 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1940).
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